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The Value of Consumer Choice in 
Products Liability 
Mark A. Geistfeld† 
INTRODUCTION 
Tort law has always recognized the principle expressed by the 
Latin maxim volenti non fit injuria, or “a person is not wronged by that 
to which he or she consents.”1 The absence of consent is part of the 
prima facie case for tort liability, distinguishing tortious behavior from 
socially acceptable behavior.2 “For example, consent turns trespass into 
a dinner party; a battery into a handshake; [or] a theft into a gift.”3  
By removing informed choices from the ambit of liability, tort 
law allows individuals to structure their relationships in the manner that 
promotes their welfare as per the requirements of allocative efficiency.4 
More fundamentally, “[t]o have the ability to create and dispel rights 
and duties [as a matter of informed, voluntary consent] is what it means 
to be an autonomous moral agent.”5 The role of consent within tort law 
derives from the value of individual autonomy or self-determination.6 
  
 †  Crystal Eastman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.  
 1 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1605 (8th ed. 2004). Modern tort law originated with 
the writ of trespass, and allegations of wrongdoing under that writ “were thought to be 
inappropriate where the defendant had acted with the consent of the plaintiff.” D.J. IBBETSON, A 
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 41-42 (1999). Thus, “[i]t is a 
fundamental principle of the common law that volenti non fit injuria—to one who is willing, no 
wrong is done.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18, at 
112 (5th ed. 1984).  
 2 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 18, at 112 (explaining why volenti non fit 
injuria “goes to negative the existence of any tort in the first instance”); see also DAN B. DOBBS, 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 218 (2000) (“In many cases, consent is not a true affirmative defense 
[to an intentional tort] but instead marks a deficiency in the plaintiff’s prima facie case.”); id. § 
212 (explaining why the prima facie case for negligence liability depends on the absence of 
consent).  
 3 Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 123 (1996). 
 4 Cf. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 9-11, 13, 15 (1960) 
(showing that when individuals have full information of all the relevant factors and do not incur 
any other costs in bargaining with others, voluntary agreements among right holders and duty 
holders will produce allocatively efficient outcomes). 
 5 Hurd, supra note 3, at 124. For purposes of legal analysis, a normative value such as 
individual autonomy is necessarily more fundamental than the instrumental objective of 
allocative efficiency. The computation of costs and benefits depends on how the legal system has 
specified the underlying legal entitlements. Consequently, neither allocative efficiency nor cost-
benefit analysis can determine initial entitlements, making the substantive content of any legal 
rule dependent on normative justification in the first instance. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Efficiency, 
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Enabling individuals to make their own safety choices as a 
matter of self-determination is a value that tort law presumably also 
recognizes in product cases. In the typical product case, the individual 
right holder is a consumer, making the value of individual choice 
equivalent to the value of consumer choice. In light of the consumerist 
orientation of contemporary society, it would be astonishing to find that 
products liability does not fundamentally value consumer choice.  
Nevertheless, the value of consumer choice in strict products 
liability is surprisingly unclear. Consider the liability rules governing 
defects of product design or warning, the most important categories of 
product defect.7 According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability, “[t]he emphasis is on creating incentives for manufacturers to 
achieve optimal levels of safety in designing and marketing products.”8 
The optimal level of safety has no evident connection to the amount of 
safety that would be chosen by consumers, because “consumer 
expectations do not play a determinative role in determining 
defectiveness.”9 Whether a product is defective in these cases instead 
depends on “[a] broad range of factors,” including “the nature and 
strength of consumer expectations regarding the product.”10 In some 
cases, consumer expectations can be “ultimately determinative” of the 
liability question,11 but it is not apparent why the liability rules 
exclusively rely on consumer choice in only these cases but not others. 
The value of consumer choice in strict products liability becomes 
even harder to discern when considered in relation to assumption of risk, 
one of the liability-limiting doctrines based on the autonomy principle.12 
According to this doctrine, an individual right holder who voluntarily 
  
Fairness, and the Economic Analysis of Tort Law, in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 234, 234-35 (Mark D. White ed., 2009).  
 6 See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 95, at 217 (“The consent principle is general in its scope, 
firm in its acceptance, and central in its significance. It makes the plaintiff’s right of self-
determination or autonomy the centerpiece of the law on intentional torts and to some extent other 
torts as well.”); Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 14 (1906) 
(“The maxim volenti non fit injuria is a terse expression of the individualistic tendency of the 
common law, which, proceeding from the people and asserting their liberties, naturally regards the 
freedom of individual action as the keystone of the whole structure.”). See generally MARK A. 
GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS (2008) (showing how the value of autonomy or self-
determination can explain the important doctrines of tort law). 
 7 Every product within a product line has the same design and warnings, and so a 
finding of defect in either respect implicates the entire product line, unlike the product-specific flaws 
of construction or manufacture that comprise the remaining category of defect. 
 8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998). 
 9 Id. § 2 cmt. g. 
 10 Id. § 2 cmt. f. 
 11 Id. § 2 cmt. g; see also id. §§ 7-8 (defining defect exclusively in terms of consumer 
expectations for food products and used products respectively). 
 12 See, e.g., Bohlen, supra note 6, at 14 (“The doctrine of the so-called voluntary 
assumption of known risks is but one of the expressions of this fundamental idea; other exhibitions 
of it, differing only with the conditions to which the conception is applied, are the defenses of 
consent and of contributory negligence. None of these is identical with any other, none is derived 
from the other, all are derivatives from a common source.”). 
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chooses to face a known risk bears responsibility for her ensuing injuries, 
thereby reducing or eliminating the liability that others might incur with 
respect to the identical safety decision.13 In the ordinary tort case, the 
doctrine can eliminate liability under the distinctive rules of express and 
primary assumption of risk, while at least reducing liability under the 
rule of secondary assumption of risk.14 By contrast, the Restatement 
(Third), like most jurisdictions, only recognizes secondary assumption of 
risk in product cases, and then treats such conduct as a form of 
contributory negligence that merely reduces the plaintiff’s recovery 
within a system of comparative responsibility.15 Assumption of risk has 
no evident role in products liability, deepening the impression that this 
body of tort law undervalues individual choice.  
The impression is misleading. Strict products liability 
appropriately values consumer choice. The value of consumer choice, 
however, is obscured by the way in which the Restatement (Third) has 
de-emphasized the importance of consumer expectations. Properly 
understood, the value of consumer choice not only justifies the liability 
rules in the Restatement (Third), it also provides the key to understanding 
the important limitations of strict products liability, including those based 
on assumed risks.  
As explained in Part I, a product seller typically incurs a tort 
duty only with respect to product attributes that frustrate the actual safety 
expectations of the ordinary consumer. Courts have long recognized that 
contractual remedies do not adequately protect uninformed consumers 
from the risk of product-caused physical harms, creating a safety 
problem that implicates the core concern of tort law. The rule of strict 
products liability accordingly addresses the safety problems stemming 
from consumers’ uninformed product decisions. An exclusive focus on 
cases involving the absence of informed consumer choice creates the 
misleading appearance that consumer choice is largely irrelevant for 
products liability. 
Part II then shows how strict products liability instantiates the 
value of consumer choice. A liability rule that is supposed to address the 
safety problems created by uninformed consumer choice should require 
  
 13 See GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 307-09 (explaining why assumption of risk only 
applies to the same safety choice implicated by the plaintiff’s prima facie case for liability). See 
generally Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of 
Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213, 238 (1987) (explaining that assumption of risk should only 
apply when the plaintiff’s “chosen course of action was based on a full and true preference, i.e., 
made with knowledge of all the alternatives that defendant had a duty to offer, including that 
alternative which plaintiff claims defendant tortiously failed to offer”). 
 14 See Fowler V. Harper et al., 4 HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 21.0, at 233 (3d 
ed. 2007). 
 15 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 17(a), cmt. a (1998) 
(recognizing an affirmative defense only when “the plaintiff’s conduct fails to conform to generally 
applicable rules establishing appropriate standards of care,” which encompasses assumption of risk 
only insofar as the plaintiff’s choice to face the risk was unreasonable); id. § 18 (refusing to enforce 
oral or written contractual limitations of liability). 
784 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3  
the amount of safety that would be chosen by consumers if they were 
fully informed. A fully informed consumer chooses the amount of 
product safety satisfying the risk-utility test. Consequently, the 
reasonable safety expectations of the ordinary consumer can be defined 
by the risk-utility test, a formulation of the liability rule that has been 
adopted by an increasing number of jurisdictions.16 This formulation does 
not simply convert consumer expectations into the risk-utility test, but 
instead relies on the value of consumer choice to justify the liability rule.   
Part III concludes by showing how the value of consumer choice 
can explain the important limitations of strict products liability, including 
the affirmative defenses. Like the other rules of strict products liability, 
the limitations of liability can be squared with the old maxim that “No 
injury or wrong is done to one who consents.” 
I. UNINFORMED CONSUMER CHOICE AS THE PREDICATE FOR 
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
The widely adopted rule of strict products liability law in section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is based on the tort doctrine 
of the implied warranty.17 “In its inception, breach of warranty was a tort. 
The . . . wrong was conceived to be a form of misrepresentation, in the 
nature of deceit . . . .”18 The misrepresentation stemmed from the manner 
in which the product frustrated the reasonable safety expectations of the 
purchaser; liability was strict in the sense that it did not require any 
culpable wrongdoing on the seller’s part. The rule of strict liability was 
instead justified by the purchaser’s lack of knowledge about the product 
attributes in question, creating a mismatch between the product’s actual 
qualities and the purchaser’s expectation of quality. 
The paradigmatic example involves the sale of contaminated 
food, which for centuries has subjected sellers to liability under implied 
warranty.19 As the Texas Supreme Court has explained: 
Liability in such case is not based on negligence, nor on a breach of the usual 
implied contractual warranty, but on the broad principle of the public policy to 
protect human health and life. It is a well-known fact that articles of food are 
manufactured and placed in the channels of commerce, with the intention that 
they shall pass from hand to hand until they are finally used by some remote 
consumer. It is usually impracticable, if not impossible, for the ultimate 
consumer to analyze the food and ascertain whether or not it is suitable for 
human consumption. Since it has been packed and placed on the market as a 
  
 16 E.g., Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., No. 104983, 2008 WL 4603565, at *21-22 (Ill. 
Oct. 17, 2008). 
 17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1965) (“There is nothing in this 
Section which would prevent any court from treating the rule stated as a matter of ‘warranty’ to the 
user or consumer.”). 
 18 William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 
117, 118 (1943). 
 19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. b (1965). 
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food for human consumption, and marked as such, the purchaser usually eats it 
or causes it to be served to his family without the precaution of having it 
analyzed by a technician to ascertain whether or not it is suitable for human 
consumption. In fact, in most instances the only satisfactory examination that 
could be made would be only at the time and place of the processing of the 
food. It seems to be the rule that where food products sold for human 
consumption are unfit for that purpose, there is such an utter failure of the 
purpose for which the food is sold, and the consequences of eating unsound 
food are so disastrous to human health and life, that the law imposes a warranty 
of purity in favor of the ultimate consumer as a matter of public policy.20 
The rule of strict liability governing the sale of contaminated 
food was extended by courts in the twentieth century to encompass other 
products.21 In adopting the rule of strict products liability, courts often 
relied on opinions authored by Justice Roger Traynor of the California 
Supreme Court.22 In his influential concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., Traynor addressed the problem of uninformed 
consumer choice: 
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets 
and transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and 
consumer of a product has been altered. Manufacturing processes, frequently 
valuable secrets, are ordinarily either inaccessible or beyond the ken of the 
general public. The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to 
investigate for himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not 
contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by 
the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and 
marketing devices such as trade-marks. Consumers no longer approach 
products warily but accept them on faith, relying on the reputation of the 
manufacturer or the trade mark.23  
By emphasizing how consumers are unable to make informed 
product choices, Traynor adopted a rationale for tort liability that had 
been invoked by others. As one commentator had observed a few years 
earlier, “[e]mphasis upon the inability of the unspecialized consumer 
adequately to inspect or test merchandise is becoming increasingly 
common and seems to have recently influenced rapid developments in 
the scope of liability to the consumer.”24 
When interpreting the rule of strict products liability, courts have 
continued to recognize the problem of uninformed consumer choice:  
In today’s world, it is often only the manufacturer who can fairly be said to 
know and to understand when an article is suitably designed and safely made 
for its intended purpose. Once floated on the market, many articles in a very 
  
 20 Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tex. 1942). 
 21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. b (1965). 
 22 See Mark A. Geistfeld, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.: Strict Products Liability 
Unbound, in TORTS STORIES 229, 235-43 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). 
 23 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted). 
 24  Note, The Marketing Structure and Judicial Protection of the Consumer, 37 COLUM. 
L. REV. 77, 77 (1937) (citations omitted). 
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real practical sense defy detection of defect, except possibly in the hands of an 
expert after laborious and perhaps even destructive disassembly.25  
The rule of strict products liability governs the designs of automobiles, 
for example, because “manufacturers of such complex products as motor 
vehicles invariably have greater access than do ordinary consumers to the 
information necessary to reach informed decisions concerning the 
efficacy of potential safety measures.”26 Thus, one of the public policy 
rationales for the rule of strict products liability is that “the consumer 
does not have the ability to investigate for himself the soundness of the 
product.”27 
Tort liability can be justified in these terms because of the safety 
problems that are created when product sellers rationally respond to the 
safety decisions made by uninformed consumers. Consider a 
manufacturer’s decision about whether to install a costly safety device to 
eliminate an unreasonable product risk of which the ordinary consumer is 
unaware. By installing the safety device, the manufacturer increases the 
cost and the price of the product. Without the device, the product would 
expose consumers to the associated risk of injury. Unless consumers 
know about the risk, they will not be willing to pay for the safety device, 
leading them to purchase the lower priced product without the device. 
Why spend money on safety if one is unaware of the need to do so? 
Manufacturers will not tell consumers about these risks, as doing so 
would only increase consumer estimates of product cost and decrease 
sales. What is the point of advertising negative product attributes to the 
consumer? The process of price competition predictably forces 
manufacturers to forego these types of safety investments, resulting in 
unreasonably dangerous products. The ensuing safety problem both 
justifies the tort duty and explains why customary product safety 
practices can be unreasonably dangerous.28 
During the 1920s, for example, the president of the automobile 
manufacturer General Motors “insisted that the company could not make 
windshields with safety glass because doing so would harm the bottom 
line.”29 The automobile manufacturers were simply responding to 
misinformed consumer demand. “G.M. believed that consumers weren’t 
prepared to pay more for cars with safety glass . . . .”30 The same 
dynamic has occurred throughout the history of automotive safety. 
During the 1950s, “auto executives told Congress that making seat belts 
  
 25 Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (N.Y. 1976) (quoting Codling v. Paglia, 
298 N.E.2d 622, 627 (N.Y. 1973)). 
 26 Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Colo. 1987). 
 27 Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Mont. 1997) (quoting Brandenburger v. 
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 513 P.2d 268, 273 (Mont. 1973)).  
 28 For a more complete analysis, including other economic rationales for the tort duty, 
see MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 34-50 (2006). 
 29 James Surowiecki, Fuel for Thought, NEW YORKER, July 23, 2007, at 25.  
 30  Id. 
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compulsory would slash industry profits.”31 The industry had the same 
response to airbags. As the president of the Chrysler Motors lamented, 
“safety has really killed all our business.”32 Without the intervention of 
tort law or other forms of safety regulation, the market would have 
adopted customary practices (no safety glass, no seat belts, no airbags) 
that were unreasonably dangerous. 
The growth of the economy and proliferation of products have 
also made it increasingly difficult for consumers to acquire information 
about product risk. Consumers now face a bewildering array of product 
choices. Over thirty thousand items are available in the typical 
supermarket.33 Experience with a brand may provide the consumer with 
some knowledge, but even that is short-lived. For U.S. manufacturing 
firms that remain in operation over a manufacturing census period (every 
five years), almost two-thirds of the firms change their product mixes, 
with the product switches involving almost half of existing products.34 
The consumer’s ability to evaluate risk is then made even more difficult 
by the increased complexity of products. Who has the time, energy and 
desire to evaluate each and every one of these product risks, particularly 
given the range of other decisions we face on a daily basis?35  
Recognizing that consumers are simply unable to evaluate all 
product risks, courts and legislatures have adopted the rule of strict 
products liability. The associated tort duty places responsibility for the 
safety decision on the party most capable of making that decision on an 
informed basis—the manufacturer.36  
  
 31 Id. 
 32  Id. 
 33 GARY CROSS, AN ALL-CONSUMING CENTURY: WHY COMMERCIALISM WON IN 
MODERN AMERICA 214 (2000). 
 34 See Andrew B. Bernard et al., Product Choice and Product Switching 5-6 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9789, 2003). 
 35 See Xavier Gabaix et al., The Allocation of Attention: Theory and Evidence 2-3 
(M.I.T. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 03-31, 2003) (analyzing “[a]ttention as a scarce 
economic resource” allocated by cost-benefit principles and providing empirical support that 
individuals act in this manner); see also BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE 
IS LESS (2004) (discussing the problem of “choice overload”); Josef Falkinger, Limited Attention as 
a Scarce Resource in Information-Rich Economies, 118 ECON. J. 1596 (2008) (analyzing how the 
limited attention of consumers affects competition in the marketplace). 
 36 The manufacturer has greater technical expertise and can make one thorough 
investigation of the product, spreading that information cost among all consumers via a price 
increase. The associated cost per consumer will often be less than the average amount that each 
consumer would otherwise incur to investigate product safety on her own. Because information 
acquisition depends on a comparison of costs and benefits incurred by the decision maker, a 
reduction in costs should increase the total amount of information acquired, assuming there is no 
change in the benefits of the information.  
  A tort duty, moreover, is likely to increase the benefits of information for the decision 
maker. A seller owing a duty to all consumers considers the benefit of added information in terms of 
that group, whereas the individual consumer acquiring information only considers her private 
benefit. The benefit for the group will typically exceed the benefit for the individual consumer. 
Because information acquisition depends on the decision maker’s comparison of costs with benefits, 
an increase in benefits should increase the amount of information acquired, all else being equal.  
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II. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AS THE INSTANTIATION OF 
INFORMED CONSUMER CHOICE 
As we have found, the tort duty is predicated on the conclusion 
that the ordinary consumer does not have sufficient information about 
product risks, causing her to undervalue product safety. Due to the 
process of price competition, these uninformed consumer choices give 
manufacturers an incentive to supply unreasonably dangerous products. 
These products are more dangerous than expected by the ordinary 
(misinformed) consumer, and so the resultant product-caused injuries 
frustrate consumer safety expectations. To address this safety problem, 
tort law overrides these misguided contractual choices (and customary 
product-safety practices more generally) by subjecting product sellers to 
a tort duty. 
The Restatement (Second) rule of strict products liability applies 
to “[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property.”37 To be 
“unreasonably dangerous,” the product attribute “must be dangerous to 
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the 
community as to its characteristics.”38 Such a product attribute frustrates 
the ordinary consumer’s actual expectations of product safety, the 
condition required for tort law to supplement the seller’s contractual 
obligations with a tort duty. 
Because the tort duty is based on the product attribute frustrating 
the actual (misinformed) safety expectations of the ordinary consumer, 
the separate element of defect must be defined in some other manner. 
Otherwise, the existence of duty would necessarily establish the 
existence of defect, conflating the two elements into a single 
requirement.  
The frustration of the ordinary consumer’s actual (misinformed) 
safety expectations creates the tort duty, and so the element of defect 
becomes a separate requirement when defined in terms of the ordinary 
consumer’s reasonable (well-informed) safety expectations. Having 
received a product with the amount of safety that she would have chosen 
if adequately informed of the relevant factors, the ordinary consumer 
could not reasonably expect some other amount of product safety. A 
product satisfying the well-informed or reasonable safety expectations of 
the ordinary consumer is not defective.39 
  
  For other reasons why a tort duty would improve safety decisions in situations of high 
information costs, see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived 
Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 770-92 (1993).  
 37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965). 
 38 Id. § 402A cmt. i. 
 39 See, e.g., Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997) 
(holding that for safety attributes that are not well understood by the ordinary consumer, “the inquiry 
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This definition of defect has a straightforward rationale. A 
liability rule formulated to address the safety problems created by 
uninformed consumer choice should require the amount of safety that 
would be chosen by consumers if they were fully informed. Fully 
informed consumers understand that products cannot always be made 
entirely safe for all uses.40 Perfection typically is either not possible or 
unduly expensive. Some product risk is usually inevitable, and so the 
mere fact that a product causes an accident does not frustrate the 
consumer’s reasonable safety expectations. The accident must instead be 
caused by a defect in the product, making the definition of defect 
dependent on the reason why the product attribute frustrates the safety 
expectations of the ordinary consumer. 
According to the Restatement (Third), “[p]roducts that 
malfunction due to manufacturing defects disappoint reasonable 
expectations of product performance,” thereby justifying strict liability.41 
A manufacturing or construction defect departs from the product’s 
intended design. In an effort to eliminate such defects, sellers adopt 
procedures or systems of quality control. Perfect quality control is not 
reasonably expected by the ordinary consumer for the same reason that 
perfect product safety is not a reasonable expectation. The complete 
elimination of product risk typically is not feasible or desirable. 
Consequently, the ordinary consumer only reasonably expects that the 
product has passed the appropriate tests of quality control. To enforce 
such an implied guarantee of product quality, the consumer can 
reasonably expect the seller to provide a guaranteed remedy for 
malfunctioning products. This guarantee makes the seller (strictly) liable 
for malfunctioning products, thereby creating the requisite financial 
incentive for reducing the incidence of these defects in a cost-effective 
manner.42 
In contrast to the rule governing construction or manufacturing 
defects, the Restatement (Third) eschews consumer expectations in favor 
of the risk-utility test to determine whether the product is defective 
  
would then be whether a reasonable consumer would consider the product design unreasonably 
dangerous,” and providing citations to a number of other jurisdictions that have adopted this 
approach).  
 40 See, e.g., Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 753 (Wis. 2001) 
(“Virtually no product is entirely safe for all consumers under all conditions, even when being used 
as intended. We presume that the ordinary consumer recognizes as much. Thus, when the ordinary 
consumer purchases or uses a product, we must assume that consumer contemplates there is at least 
some danger involved.”). 
 41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998). 
 42 See GEISTFELD, supra note 28, at 30-31; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998) (“[I]mposing strict liability on manufacturers for harm caused by 
manufacturing defects encourages greater investment in product safety than does a regime of fault-
based liability under which, as a practical matter, sellers may escape their appropriate share of 
responsibility.”). 
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because of design or an inadequate warning.43 Doing so is unnecessary, if 
not counterproductive.   
Excluding instances of bystander injuries (discussed in Part 
III.A), product cases only implicate consumer interests. Any tort burdens 
incurred by the manufacturer or other product sellers, including the cost 
of safety investments and liability for injury compensation, are passed on 
to the consumer in the form of higher prices.44 Consequently, the risk-
utility test in the Restatement (Third) is formulated entirely in terms of 
consumer interests: “[I]t is not a factor . . . that the imposition of liability 
would have a negative effect on corporate earnings or would reduce 
employment in a given industry.”45 Why would a risk-utility test that is 
limited to consumer interests ever require product designs or warnings 
that are not reasonably expected by the ordinary consumer? 
Indeed, the consumer’s full set of interests is best protected by 
safety investments satisfying the cost-benefit version of the risk-utility 
test. For example, the risk of a car design without an airbag refers to the 
increased risk the consumer will suffer injury due to the absence of the 
airbag, a measure corresponding to the consumer’s injury costs that 
would be reduced or eliminated by the airbag. The utility of the design 
without an airbag involves any savings the consumer experiences by not 
having the airbag, an amount equal to the total cost of the airbag. Under 
the cost-benefit version of the risk-utility test, the car is defective for not 
having an airbag if the utility of the existing design is less than the 
increased risk posed by the design: 
added utility of design without airbag < added risk of design without airbag 
total cost of airbag < injury costs eliminated by airbag 
For safety investments satisfying this condition, consumer right 
holders incur a cost or burden that is less than the associated benefit they 
derive from the enhanced product safety (the reduction of expected 
injury costs). A product containing the cost-benefit amount of product 
safety promotes consumer welfare as reasonably expected by the 
ordinary consumer, thereby satisfying the seller’s tort obligation.46 
Proof that a product is defectively designed usually involves a 
comparison of the existing design to a proposed alternative. “While a 
manufacturer has a duty to design a product that is reasonably safe for its 
foreseeable use, it is not required to design the ‘best possible product,’ 
  
 43 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998). 
 44 See GEISTFELD, supra note 28, at 38 n.7 (providing more rigorous support for this 
claim). 
 45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (1998). 
 46 Cf. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 583 (2d ed. 1997) (“The reasonable 
expectation of the user or consumer is to be determined through consideration of a number of 
factors, including the relative cost of the product, the gravity of potential harm from a claimed 
defect, and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing risk.”).  
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and ‘proof that technology existed, which if implemented could feasibly 
have avoided a dangerous condition, does not alone establish a defect.’”47 
Increased product safety typically increases product costs for the 
consumer due to increased price or decreased functionality. The safest 
possible product is not preferred by a well-informed consumer whenever 
the benefits of such safety for the consumer are outweighed by the 
resultant costs borne by the consumer. A design defect, therefore, is 
defined by reference to a reasonable alternative design.48 By proving that 
there is a reasonable alternative to the existing product design—one that 
passes the risk-utility test in the usual case—the plaintiff in effect proves 
that the manufacturer failed to provide the design that would be chosen 
by well-informed consumers.49 
To further foster informed consumer choice, strict products 
liability obligates the seller to warn consumers of any unknown product 
risks that would be material to their decisions concerning the purchase or 
safe use of the product.50 Insofar as the average or ordinary consumer is 
unaware of a risk, a warning to that effect allows her to make an 
informed risk-utility decision. The duty to warn is the most obvious 
instance in which strict products liability is formulated in terms of 
consumer choice, further confirming that this body of tort law strives to 
create outcomes that instantiate the value of informed consumer choice.  
III. CONSUMER CHOICE AS A LIMITATION OF STRICT PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY 
The value of consumer choice provides a compelling 
justification for strict products liability, and yet many reject this rationale 
on the ground that consumer choice places too great of a limit on tort 
liability. As a leading treatise explains: 
The utility of the consumer expectations test is severely compromised when 
design dangers are obvious. Because consumers acquire their safety and danger 
expectations most directly from a product’s appearance, obvious dangers—
such as the risk to human limbs from an unguarded power mower or industrial 
machine—are virtually always contemplated or expected by the user or 
consumer who thereby is necessarily unprotected by the consumer expectations 
  
 47 Robinson v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 500 F.3d 691, 696 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying 
South Dakota law) (citing Sexton ex rel. Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 
1991)) (internal citation omitted). 
 48 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 Reporters’ Note, cmt. d 
(1998). 
 49 For cases in which the design prevents the product from performing its intended 
function, the plaintiff does not need to establish defect by reference to a reasonable alternative 
design. See id. § 3 cmt. b. By purchasing or using the product, the ordinary consumer reasonably 
expects that there is some design that would enable the product to perform its intended function. The 
proof of malfunction accordingly establishes the frustration of reasonable expectations, regardless of 
whether the plaintiff can identify a reasonable alternative design. 
 50 See GEISTFELD, supra note 28, at 134-59 (explaining the duty to warn and showing 
how it fosters informed consumer decision making). 
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test, no matter how probable or severe the likely danger nor how easy or cheap 
the means of avoiding it. . . . And a pure consumer expectations test 
perniciously rewards manufacturers for failing to adopt cost-effective measures 
to remedy obviously unnecessary dangers to human life and limb. The failure 
of the consumer expectations test to deal adequately with the obvious danger 
problem profoundly weakens the usefulness of this test and effectively 
disqualifies it for principled use as the sole basis for determining defects in 
design.51 
This characterization of consumer expectations mistakenly 
assumes that a consumer who is aware of a danger has necessarily made 
an informed safety choice about the matter. Awareness of risk is only 
one factor in the consumer’s safety decision, and so consumer 
expectations are not satisfied simply because the danger is open or 
obvious. For an important class of safety decisions, however, consumer 
expectations are satisfied with respect to apparent risks, thereby 
explaining otherwise puzzling rules concerning important limitations of 
strict products liability. Rather than providing a reason to reject 
consumer expectations, the problem of known or obvious dangers further 
supports the conclusion that strict products liability appropriately values 
consumer choice. 
A. Open or Obvious Dangers 
The problem of open or obvious dangers is addressed by the 
patent-danger rule, which originated in cases involving a product 
malfunction that allegedly breached the implied warranty. According to 
this rule, 
if the buyer has examined the goods and their defects are discovered, or so 
obvious that he could avoid discovery only by shutting his eyes as to what was 
evident, the warranty is ineffective. The reason is that he must understand that 
the seller is offering for sale what is before him, as it appears to be; and even 
express language, at least in any form other than an explicit reference to the 
defect itself, will not entitle him to expect anything different.52 
When the consumer knows of an open or obvious danger that the 
product might malfunction, the occurrence of such a malfunction does 
not frustrate consumer expectations of performance. Products breach the 
implied warranty “if they cannot be used.”53 Thus, “any latent condition, 
such as a pin inside of a loaf of bread, which would prevent purchase if it 
were known, is enough” to breach the warranty.54 Having decided to 
purchase and then use the particular product despite its open or obvious 
danger of malfunction, the plaintiff cannot claim that the associated 
  
 51 DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 8.3, at 490-91 (2d ed. 2008) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 52 Prosser, supra note 18, at 153 (footnotes omitted). 
 53 Id. at 132. 
 54 Id. at 137 (footnote omitted). 
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defect would prevent purchase or use of that product as required by the 
allegation of liability, thereby barring recovery.  
In these cases, the plaintiff made an informed safety decision 
that is identical to the decision implicated by the allegation of liability. In 
deciding to purchase the product, the plaintiff presumably figured out 
how much utility she would derive from the product use after subtracting 
the purchase price and other costs. She also knew of the defect that could 
cause the product to malfunction. Her purchase of the product, therefore, 
involved an informed decision that the total net utility of using the 
product exceeded the risk of malfunction. That risk-utility decision is 
inconsistent with the plaintiff’s allegation that the product breached the 
implied warranty. According to the allegation of breach, this particular 
product should not have been sold, a condition that is satisfied only if the 
risk of malfunction exceeds the total net utility of product use. Because 
the plaintiff had already made an informed decision that the risk of 
malfunction is less than the total net utility of product use, a court that 
respects the value of consumer choice will bar the plaintiff’s recovery.55 
This rationale for the patent-danger rule does not apply to most 
allegations of defective design involving open or obvious dangers. A 
consumer’s decision of whether to purchase a product in light of a known 
danger of malfunction is fundamentally different from most safety 
decisions involving product design. Product malfunctions implicate the 
consumer’s decision of whether to purchase or use the product at all. By 
contrast, the issue of defective design normally implicates a different 
decision. For example, if there were no automobiles equipped with 
airbags, consumers would still use these products. In deciding to use a 
car, the consumer presumably concluded that the total benefits of using 
the automobile outweigh its total costs. An informed risk-utility decision 
concerning an airbag, by contrast, compares the cost (or disutility) of the 
airbag with its safety benefit (or reduced risk of injury). The consumer’s 
decision to use the automobile differs from the risk-utility decision 
implicated by the allegation of defective design. The court can value the 
  
     55  Even if the plaintiff only used the product and did not purchase it, the value of 
consumer choice would still bar recovery. In products liability, the “consumer” includes both the 
purchaser and other expected users of the product. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 
161 A.2d 69, 80-81 (N.J. 1960) (“[T]he connotation of ‘consumer’ [is] broader than that of ‘buyer.’ 
He signifie[s] such a person, who, in the reasonable contemplation of the parties to the sale, might be 
expected to use the product.”). Similarly, welfare economists typically evaluate consumer behavior 
in terms of households rather than individuals. See, e.g., ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, 
WELFARE ECONOMICS 8 (1984). The consumer can be conceptualized in this manner because the 
interests of such a product user are indistinguishable from those of the buyer. One who purchases a 
product presumably gives equal consideration to the welfare of those whom she expects to use the 
product, such as family members, friends, or employees. As a product user whose interests were 
adequately accounted for by the purchaser, the plaintiff only reasonably expects the amount of 
product safety that is acceptable to the buyer. See GEISTFELD, supra note 28, at 39 nn.9-10 
(illustrating the point in the context of employer-employee relationships and analogizing the issue to 
the duty a landowner owes to licensees). Consequently, even if the plaintiff did not actually purchase 
the product, her role as consumer makes it appropriate to analyze the case as if she were the 
purchaser. 
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plaintiff’s choice to use the product without barring her claim that this 
open or obvious danger constitutes a design defect. 
The obvious absence of a safety device like an airbag also does 
not imply that the plaintiff or any other consumer had adequate 
knowledge of the risk-utility features of the device. Prior to the 
widespread adoption of airbags, how many consumers actually knew that 
they could be installed in cars or how they work? Even today, how many 
consumers truly know about the cost of an airbag, which includes not 
only the price of an airbag but also replacement costs and any increased 
injury costs created by the airbag, such as the risk posed to children? 
Indeed, “the ordinary consumer of an automobile simply has ‘no idea’ of 
how it should perform in all foreseeable situations, or how safe it should 
be made against all foreseeable hazards.”56 Without such knowledge, the 
consumer cannot make an informed risk-utility decision about the airbag 
or any other safety device that would eliminate an open or obvious 
danger posed by the automobile design. 
The cost of acquiring and processing all of the risk-utility 
information can also induce the consumer to forego the evaluation 
altogether. Given the multitude of apparent risks that an individual 
confronts on a daily basis, does it make sense to evaluate each one with a 
full-blown risk-utility or cost-benefit analysis? At most, consumers will 
engage in a limited number of risk-utility decisions, even for open or 
obvious product risks.57 
Consistent with this reasoning, courts have long recognized that 
an open or obvious danger can frustrate consumer expectations in breach 
of the implied warranty: 
The offer to sell “what you see” cannot charge the buyer with acceptance of 
what is not visible; and the question becomes one of whether the understanding 
that goods of merchantable quality are to be sold is destroyed merely by the 
fact that the buyer has inspected at all. . . . It is entirely possible that the seller 
may say, in effect, “Here are merchantable goods, of the kind and quality sold 
on the market; if you have doubts, you are free to examine them;” and after 
examination the buyer may say, in return, “They look alright; I will take them 
for what they appear to be, but for the rest I will rely upon your undertaking as 
to quality.” Under such conditions, the warranty may of course still be implied, 
even where the buyer has made the fullest examination open to him, and 
certainly all the more readily where his inspection is only a hasty or partial one, 
or where he declines the opportunity and does not inspect at all.58 
To satisfy the implied warranty, products “must be marketable 
with their true character known.”59 Products have become increasingly 
complex, making it increasingly difficult for consumers to discern the 
  
 56 Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994) (quoting Barker v. Lull 
Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978)). 
  57 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 58 Prosser, supra note 18, at 154-55 (footnotes omitted). 
 59 Id. at 128-29. 
2009] VALUE OF CONSUMER CHOICE 795 
true character of apparent product risks. Are they inherent in the product 
or could they be eliminated by cost-effective changes in product design? 
“Whether a danger is open and obvious depends not just on what people 
can see with their eyes but also on what they know and believe about 
what they see.”60 A consumer who is aware of an open or obvious danger 
can expect that such a risk is inherent in the product and cannot be 
eliminated by cost-effective safety investments. If such a risk could be 
eliminated in this manner and the seller failed to do so, the product 
design frustrates consumer expectations and subjects the seller to tort 
liability for the ensuing physical harms. 
In the years leading up to the adoption of strict products liability, 
courts were increasingly willing to find that the implied warranty 
governed apparent dangers that had been inspected by the purchaser, 
turning these otherwise open or obvious dangers into latent defects not 
subject to the patent-danger rule:  
[T]he emphasis has been shifted to the actual understanding of the parties, with 
the result that there has been a strong tendency to find a warranty as to latent 
defects even in the face of inspection. This has proved to be all the more 
necessary as goods have become more highly specialized, marketing processes 
more complex, and buyers more helpless to form any intelligent estimate of the 
character of the goods on the basis of their own examination or tests.61 
These cases establish the important principle that if the consumer 
cannot make an “intelligent estimate” of all the relevant risk-utility 
factors, consumer expectations can be frustrated by risks that are 
otherwise open or obvious, subjecting the seller to tort liability. This 
principle was established by warranty cases that were all decided before 
the 1960s, making them part of the doctrinal foundation for the rule of 
strict products liability.62 This principle accordingly justifies the rule 
adopted by most courts that the plaintiff is not barred from recovery 
under strict products liability merely because the danger was apparent.63 
In order for consumer expectations to be satisfied, the consumer 
must have made the safety decision on the basis of good information 
about all of the risk-utility factors. As we have found, a well-informed 
consumer will choose to face only those risks that cannot be eliminated 
by cost-effective safety investments.64 Consequently, consumer 
expectations are satisfied by risks that are “inherent in the product, 
  
 60 Corbin v. Coleco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying Illinois 
law). 
 61 Prosser, supra note 18, at 156 (footnotes omitted). 
 62 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1965) (“There is 
nothing in this Section which would prevent any court from treating the rule stated as a matter of 
‘warranty’ to the user or consumer.”), with Prosser, supra note 18, at 155-56 & nn.218-19 
(explaining this principle and providing citations to warranty cases decided prior to 1943). 
 63 See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 576-77 (N.Y. 1976). 
 64 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.  
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completely within the cognition of a reasonable user, and incapable of 
being economically alleviated.”65  
Once the patent-danger rule has been formulated in these terms, 
it explains the otherwise puzzling line of cases in which the plaintiff 
claims that a product is defective no matter how it is designed. Such a 
claim effectively asserts that for the general category of comparable or 
substitute products, the design of each one is defective. Because any 
product within the category is alleged to be defectively designed and 
unreasonably dangerous, the product at issue in the suit is also defective 
and unreasonably dangerous, regardless of its particular design features. 
“American courts have avoided product category [liability] like the 
plague,”66 although tort scholars have continued to question the rationale 
for doing so.67 “After all, if strict liability attaches to products with 
unreasonably dangerous features how can it not reasonably attach to 
unreasonably dangerous products?”68 The answer is supplied by 
consumer expectations. Categorical risks are inherent in the product, 
completely within the cognition of an ordinary user, and incapable of 
being economically alleviated, thereby satisfying the (properly 
formulated) patent-danger rule and explaining why courts routinely reject 
claims of categorical liability. 
To see why, recall that the tort duty makes it reasonable for the 
consumer to assume that the product contains no manufacturing or 
construction flaws. By relying on the tort duty, the consumer can also 
assume that each product design within the category is reasonably safe. 
In effect, the tort duty guarantees the reasonable safety of all products 
within each category, enabling the ordinary consumer to focus on the 
risk-utility comparisons across product categories, such as that involved 
in comparing a standard automobile to a subcompact car. In making 
choices across product categories, the ordinary consumer also benefits 
from the duty to warn, which guarantees that the product warning 
provides the ordinary consumer with the material information required 
for informed safety decisions.69 Once the information already held by the 
ordinary consumer is supplemented by the information provided by the 
product warning, she presumably is able to make an informed categorical 
  
 65 House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 929 P.2d 340, 344 (Utah 1996) (quoting Wheeler v. 
John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1104 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
 66 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Fictional Tale of Unintended 
Consequences: A Response to Professor Wertheimer, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 939, 945 (2005); see also 
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: 
The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1329 (1991) (“[M]ost courts that 
have considered product-category liability claims have rejected them out of hand. And of the very 
few decisions that have embraced the notion, each has been reversed by its respective state 
legislature.”). 
 67 See generally Symposium, Generic Products Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 
(1996). 
 68 Carl T. Bogus, The Third Revolution in Products Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 
11 (1996). 
 69 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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choice. The ordinary consumer presumably then makes such a 
categorical risk-utility assessment in deciding whether to choose one 
product category over another (such as the subcompact over the 
standard-sized automobile), even if she forgoes more limited risk-utility 
evaluations involving particular safety devices (like an airbag, the 
steering mechanism, the braking system, and so on). Having made an 
informed categorical risk-utility decision, the ordinary consumer’s actual 
expectations of safety are satisfied in that regard, thereby eliminating the 
seller’s design duty with respect to any risk that is inherent in the product 
category.  
The plaintiff, for example, cannot claim that a microbus is 
defectively designed for not having the safety features characteristic of a 
standard passenger vehicle.70 Similarly, the plaintiff cannot claim that a 
bullet-proof vest is defectively designed merely because it does not 
provide the more extensive protection afforded by other styles that were 
available on the market.71 Having chosen a less safe alternative, the 
consumer does not expect the greater safety offered by a product 
configuration she decided not to purchase. 
For the same reason, the consumer’s informed choice of an 
optional safety feature can bar a claim of strict products liability: 
The product is not defective where the evidence and reasonable inferences 
therefrom show that: (1) the buyer is thoroughly knowledgeable regarding the 
product and its use and is actually aware that the safety feature is available; (2) 
there exist normal circumstances of use in which the product is not 
unreasonably dangerous without the optional equipment; and (3) the buyer is in 
a position, given the range of uses of the product, to balance the benefits and 
the risks of not having the safety device in the specifically contemplated 
circumstances of the buyer’s use of the product. In such a case, the buyer, not 
the manufacturer, is in the superior position to make the risk-utility assessment, 
and a well-considered decision by the buyer to dispense with the optional safety 
equipment will excuse the manufacturer from liability.72  
Liability is limited in this manner in order to further the value of 
consumer choice. “Consumers are entitled to consider the risks and 
benefits of the different designs and choose among them.”73 These 
choices satisfy the actual safety expectations of the ordinary consumer, 
so the product is not “unreasonably dangerous” under the Restatement 
(Second) rule of strict products liability.74  
When applied in this manner, 
  
 70 Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1069, 1073-75 (4th Cir. 1974) 
(applying Virginia law). 
 71 Linegar v. Armour of Am., Inc., 909 F.2d 1150, 1151-54 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying 
Missouri law). 
 72 Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679, 683 (N.Y. 1999) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 73 Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 259 (Tex. 1999). 
 74 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.  
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the “unreasonably dangerous” requirement serves the useful function of 
balancing safety considerations against a policy which favors product diversity 
and consumer choice. Automobiles, and numerous other types of products, vary 
considerably in their safety features and characteristics. However, the law does 
not require that manufacturers produce only the safest product feasible in order 
to avoid being exposed to liability. Rather it requires them to avoid placing on 
the market products that are rendered “unreasonably dangerous” because of a 
defect in design or manufacture.75 
So construed, the “unreasonably dangerous” requirement serves 
its intended purpose of ensuring that product sellers are not subject to 
liability merely because the consumer was injured by a known risk that 
inheres in the product.76 When the ordinary consumer has knowledge of 
those risks that are inherent in the product category—an informational 
requirement addressed by the seller’s duty to warn—then she is capable 
of making an informed categorical risk-utility decision, thereby 
precluding a claim of categorical liability. 
The value of informed consumer choice justifies the widespread 
rejection of categorical liability, and yet the Restatement (Third) 
acknowledges the possibility of categorical liability for “manifestly 
unreasonable design” of products with “low social utility and [a] high 
degree of danger.”77 How could any application of categorical liability be 
squared with consumer expectations? After all, if the ordinary consumer 
has made an informed categorical risk-utility decision, why should the 
seller be obliged to make the contrary decision? The answer involves an 
alternative rationale for categorical liability, one that shows why the 
value of consumer choice is not always a defensible reason for limiting 
liability. 
  
 75 Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 701 P.2d 628, 632 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985), rev’d on 
other grounds, 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987). 
 76 In discussing the “unreasonably dangerous” requirement in section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second), the California Supreme Court has observed that: 
a “defective condition” is one “not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be 
unreasonably dangerous to him.” (Rest.2d Torts § 402A, com. g.) Comment i, defining 
“unreasonably dangerous,” states, “The article sold must be dangerous to an extent 
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, 
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.” 
Examples given in comment i make it clear that such innocuous products as sugar and 
butter, unless contaminated, would not give rise to a strict liability claim merely because 
the former may be harmful to a diabetic or the latter may aggravate the blood cholesterol 
level of a person with heart disease. Presumably such dangers are squarely within the 
contemplation of the ordinary consumer. Prosser, the reporter for the Restatement, 
suggests that the “unreasonably dangerous” qualification was added to foreclose the 
possibility that the manufacturer of a product with inherent possibilities for harm (for 
example, butter, drugs, whiskey and automobiles) would become “automatically 
responsible for all the harm that such things do in the world.”  
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1161 (Cal. 1972) (emphasis added) (quoting William 
L. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 23. (1966)). 
 77 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e (1998).  
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The analysis so far has been confined to the consumer, a concept 
including the buyer and other users of the product.78 Excluded are third 
parties or bystanders. When consumers face low information costs and 
have a choice among safety options, they are able to make informed 
safety choices that best promote their interests. In these cases, the 
rejection of categorical liability appropriately defers to consumer choice. 
Deference to consumer choice is not compelling, though, when third-
party interests are at stake. Consumers who make safety decisions by 
reference to their own interests can make product choices that are 
unreasonably dangerous for bystanders.79 In these cases, the value of 
consumer choice does not justify a limitation of liability, explaining why 
the Restatement (Third) and many courts could defensibly recognize that 
categorical liability is appropriate if the product has “low social utility” 
(for the consumer) that is outweighed by the “high degree of danger” 
(faced by the consumer and bystanders). 
Except for these circumstances, the risk-utility decision is 
limited to consumer interests, and the value of consumer choice justifies 
the widespread rejection of categorical liability. The ordinary consumer 
can make an informed categorical risk-utility decision, with the 
satisfaction of consumer expectations negating categorical liability or 
otherwise being “ultimately determinative” of the risk-utility inquiry in 
the Restatement (Third).80 In contrast to the categorical risk-utility 
decision, consumers usually do not make informed risk-utility decisions 
about every other apparent risk posed by a product. Consumer 
expectations are not satisfied simply because a danger is open or 
obvious. When properly formulated in terms of consumer expectations, 
the patent-danger rule does not bar recovery for every apparent danger, 
but instead limits strict products liability only when doing so furthers the 
value of informed consumer choice. 
B. Assumed Risks 
The value of individual choice in tort law traditionally has been 
associated with the doctrine of assumed risks:  
The assumed risk rule was sometimes expressed in terms of the maxim, volenti 
non fit injuria or under the name of incurred risk. However formulated, the 
essential idea was that the plaintiff assumed the risk whenever she expressly 
agreed to do so by contract or otherwise, and also when she impliedly did so by 
words or conduct. Courts began to think that conduct implied consent whenever 
the plaintiff had specific knowledge of the risk posed by the defendant’s 
negligence, appreciated its nature, and proceeded voluntarily to encounter it 
nonetheless. The Restatement and more modern theory added that the risk was 
  
 78 See supra note 55. 
 79 See GEISTFELD, supra note 28, at 252-59. 
 80 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (1998). 
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assumed only if the plaintiff’s conduct in encountering the risk manifested the 
plaintiff’s willingness to accept responsibility for the risk.81 
In product cases, plaintiffs cannot assume the risk expressly by 
contract. According to the Restatement (Third), courts do not enforce 
contractual or express waivers of strict products liability because “[i]t is 
presumed that the ordinary product user or consumer lacks sufficient 
information and bargaining power to execute a fair contractual limitation 
of rights to recover.”82 A disclaimer operates against a tort duty, which in 
turn exists only when the ordinary consumer is unable to make an 
informed risk-utility decision about the safety matter in question.83 An 
individual consumer like the plaintiff presumably has the characteristics 
of the ordinary consumer, and so the waiver question only arises when 
the plaintiff presumably lacks sufficient information about the risks. 
Insofar as there is no reliable way to determine whether the plaintiff 
differs from the ordinary (uninformed) consumer in this respect, the 
presumption cannot be rebutted; the court must conclude that the plaintiff 
did not have enough information to execute a fair contractual limitation 
of her right to recover.84 Evidential limitations can explain why courts do 
not recognize contractual or express assumption of risk in product cases.  
Courts can also refuse to enforce disclaimers for policy reasons. 
At the time of purchase, the consumer knows that the seller has 
completed its investments in product safety. Liability could not induce 
the seller to make any further safety investments, giving each consumer 
at the point of sale an incentive to waive liability in exchange for a 
reduction in product price. But because consumers will predictably act in 
this way, the resultant lack of liability would remove the financial 
incentive for product sellers to comply with the tort obligation in the first 
instance. Waivers, therefore, can yield unreasonably dangerous products 
when courts permit all consumers to waive liability.85 A rule that permits 
only some consumers to waive liability, in turn, would then be unfair to 
those consumers who are foreclosed from that opportunity. These 
consumers would incur the full cost of ensuring that the seller complies 
with the tort duty, whereas those consumers who could waive liability 
would still be effectively protected by the tort duty—their products 
would be reasonably safe as required by the tort duty—but they would 
not have to incur the costs of enforcing that duty. To ensure that each 
consumer pays a fair share of the tort burden, courts can refuse to enforce 
  
 81 DOBBS, supra note 2, § 210 at 535 (footnotes omitted). 
 82 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 18 cmt. a (1998). 
 83 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
 84 Cf. GEISTFELD, supra note 28, at 236-37 (explaining why the plaintiff’s experience 
with or expertise about the product does not reliably prove that she made an informed risk-utility 
decision to use the defective product). 
 85 See generally Abraham L. Wickelgren, The Inefficiency of Contractually-Based 
Liability With Rational Consumers, 22 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 168 (2006). 
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contractual or express disclaimers of liability without denying the value 
of consumer choice. 
Courts in product cases also do not explicitly recognize another 
formulation of the assumed risk rule, known as primary assumption of 
risk. Under this doctrine, a right holder’s choice to engage in a risky 
activity, such as downhill skiing, makes her responsible for the risks 
inherent in the activity.86 In these cases, the ordinary right holder (skier) 
has enough information to make an informed decision that the benefits of 
engaging in the activity (skiing) outweigh the inherent risks, thereby 
relieving the duty holder (a ski resort) of responsibility for those risks.87 
This defense does not have to be explicitly recognized in product cases 
because the identical principle justifies the rule against categorical 
liability. Rather than conclude that the consumer has primarily assumed 
the risk inherent in the activity (or the use of any product within the 
category), courts instead conclude that the product design satisfies 
consumer expectations and is not defective. As in the case of primary 
assumption of risk, the ordinary right holder (consumer) can make an 
informed decision that the benefits of engaging in the activity (or the 
utility of using the product) outweigh its inherent risks, relieving the duty 
holder (product seller) of responsibility for that particular safety decision. 
Strict products liability furthers the value of informed consumer choice 
in the manner required by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, 
even though that formulation of the assumed risk rule is not expressly 
recognized as an affirmative defense.  
The only remaining cases that implicate the assumed risk rule are 
those in which the defendant imposed a tortious risk on the plaintiff, who 
then had a choice of whether to continue to face the risk. To breach the 
duty under strict products liability, the defendant must have sold a 
defective product that was unreasonably dangerous. Even though the 
buyer did not know of the defect at the time of purchase (rendering the 
product “unreasonably dangerous” as per the Restatement (Second) rule 
of strict products liability), the plaintiff could subsequently gain 
knowledge of the defect. If the plaintiff then decided to use the product 
despite the known defect and was injured as a result, her tort claim 
against the seller would be governed by the doctrine known as secondary 
assumption of risk.88 
  
 86 E.g., Morgan v. State, 685 N.E.2d 202, 207 (N.Y. 1997) (“[B]y engaging in a sport or 
recreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent 
in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation.”). 
 87 See, e.g., Sajkowski v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Greater New York, 702 
N.Y.S.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (“[I]f the risks of an activity are fully comprehended or 
perfectly obvious, one who participates in the activity is deemed to have consented to the risks. 
Furthermore, where the risk is open and obvious, the mere fact that the defendant could have 
provided safer conditions is irrelevant.”) (citations omitted). 
 88 See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 703, 707-08 (Cal. 1992) (distinguishing 
primary and secondary assumption of risk in terms of whether the defendant breached a duty owed 
to the plaintiff). 
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These claims are barred by the value of informed consumer 
choice only when the plaintiff’s choice to use the defective product was 
based on a risk-utility decision identical to the one implicated by the 
allegation of liability. This condition is not satisfied for the class of 
claims in question. 
For example, assume the plaintiff discovers that an automobile is 
defectively designed for not containing an airbag. As previously 
discussed, the plaintiff’s risk-utility decision to use the automobile 
fundamentally differs from the risk-utility decision implicated by her 
allegation that the design is defective for not including airbags.89 A 
plaintiff who knows about a design defect and still uses the product has 
not made a risk-utility decision that is inconsistent with her allegation of 
liability, enabling the court to value the plaintiff’s safety decision while 
still recognizing her liability claim. 
Indeed, the plaintiff’s decision to use the automobile without an 
airbag would be reasonable—the net benefits of using the car clearly 
outweigh the added risk posed by the absence of airbags. Under the 
assumed risk rule, “the plaintiff’s acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if 
the defendant’s tortious conduct has left him no reasonable alternative 
course of conduct in order to . . . exercise or protect a right or privilege 
of which the defendant has no right to deprive him.”90 A product seller 
has no right to deprive a consumer of the right to use the product in a 
reasonable manner, and the only way the plaintiff can use the automobile 
requires him to face the risk posed by the absence of an airbag. The 
plaintiff’s reasonable choice to use such a product with a known defect is 
not “voluntary” for purposes of the assumed risk rule, nor does the 
plaintiff’s reasonable product use provide any other ground for reducing 
the seller’s liability. 
The same outcome occurs with respect to construction or 
manufacturing defects. This allegation of strict products liability implies 
that the defect renders the product unfit for sale, and so the allegation can 
be barred by the consumer’s informed risk-utility choice to purchase the 
product with a known risk of malfunction.91 Unlike these cases, the 
present inquiry is limited to defects that the consumer discovered only 
after purchase. In deciding whether to use a product that has already been 
purchased, the consumer presumably compares the net utility of the 
particular use with the risk posed by that use. The decision to use the 
defective product does not incorporate the sunk cost of the purchase 
price, an obvious difference with the earlier purchase decision (made 
without knowledge of the defect) that is implicated by the allegation of 
liability. Once again, the plaintiff’s informed choice to use the allegedly 
  
 89 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
 90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E(2)(b) (1965). 
 91 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
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defective product can be fully valued by a court that recognizes the 
plaintiff’s allegation of liability. 
For these reasons, the Restatement (Second) defensibly reduces 
the plaintiff’s recovery for secondary assumption of risk only when the 
plaintiff “voluntarily and unreasonably proceed[s] to encounter a known 
danger.”92 The plaintiff’s choice does not bar recovery—the choice to use 
the product on a particular occasion is not inconsistent with the 
allegation of liability—and so the only reason for reducing the plaintiff’s 
recovery involves instances in which her decision to use the product was 
unreasonable. Such a decision is merely a form of unreasonable conduct 
indistinguishable from other forms of contributory negligence. 
Secondary assumption of risk is also limited to cases of contributory 
negligence in the Restatement (Third), which allows for a reduction of 
the plaintiff’s damages only when “the plaintiff’s conduct fails to 
conform to generally applicable rules establishing appropriate standards 
of care.”93 The plaintiff’s choice regarding product use can provide a 
ground for reducing the seller’s liability, but the reason does not stem 
from the value of informed consumer choice, thereby explaining why the 
plaintiff is not entirely barred from recovery.94 
CONCLUSION 
The growth of products liability has been astounding, 
particularly when compared to the slowly evolving tort rules of the 
common law. In 1965, the rule of strict products liability was adopted by 
the American Law Institute in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, and was then adopted by most states shortly thereafter. The 
dozen or so pages devoted to the problem of product defects in the 
Restatement (Second) subsequently led to a body of law requiring over 
three hundred pages of exposition in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability, which was adopted by the American Law Institute in 
1997.95  
  
 92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965). 
 93 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 17(a) (1998). 
 94 Product misuse instead implicates an issue of fairness across consumers. The 
individual plaintiff’s vindication of the tort right can also protect other consumers with respect to 
defects, like product design, that threaten other consumers in the market. The elimination of such 
defects works to the benefit of all right holders, but the damages award also increases the product 
price for all other consumers, including those who do not misuse the product. Whether the plaintiff’s 
recovery should be reduced for product misuse, therefore, depends on how this benefit and burden 
should be fairly distributed across consumers. Consistent with this reasoning, “[a] major policy 
reason which courts articulate for accepting comparative responsibility is that allowing a victim’s 
negligence to be irrelevant to her recovery is unduly unfair because it makes careful product users 
bear the costs created by the careless users of products.” William J. McNichols, The Relevance of the 
Plaintiff’s Misconduct in Strict Tort Products Liability, the Advent of Comparative Responsibility, 
and the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 201, 242 (1994).  
 95  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998). 
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A rapidly developing body of law cannot be simply restated, and 
the ongoing interplay between consumer expectations and the risk-utility 
test has proven to be a particularly hard problem. A number of courts 
have rejected the Restatement (Third)’s risk-utility test for defective 
product designs because it “fundamentally alter[s] the law of product 
liability in this state.”96 As the Maryland Court of Appeals explained, 
“[g]iven the controversy that continues to surround the risk-utility 
standard articulated for design defect cases in . . . the Restatement 
(Third), we are reluctant at this point to cast aside our existing 
jurisprudence in favor of such an approach on any broad, general 
basis.”97 Although these decisions cast doubt on the overall approach 
adopted by the Restatement (Third), they also provide important support 
for the Restatement (Third). Having forcefully rejected the risk-utility 
test in the Restatement (Third), most of these courts have then 
incorporated the risk-utility test into their existing jurisprudence of 
consumer expectations based on the Restatement (Second).98 Typically, 
the resultant liability rule is “in actuality, perfectly consistent with” the 
Restatement (Third).99 Why do courts flatly reject the risk-utility test in 
the Restatement (Third) and then immediately incorporate that test into 
the Restatement (Second) liability rule? 
Perhaps these courts have become entangled in “rhetorical 
confusion [that] is largely unnecessary.”100 For reasons articulated here, 
courts could defensibly reject the basic approach of the Restatement 
(Third) while also adopting its liability rules. The Restatement (Third) 
has obscured the essential way in which strict products liability depends 
on consumer expectations, thereby creating the misleading impression 
that this body of law does not adequately value consumer choice.101 
Rather than being confused about the liability rules, courts could rightly 
reject any approach that does not appropriately recognize the value of 
consumer choice in products liability. 
The value of consumer choice is recognized by the Restatement 
(Second) rule of strict products liability—the textual source of 
contemporary products liability law. The rule has considerably evolved 
over a short period of time. Courts have applied it to different sets of 
circumstances, producing a larger number of distinct doctrines that are 
addressed by the Restatement (Third). As the common origin of these 
varied doctrines, the Restatement (Second) rule of strict products liability 
  
 96 Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., No. 104983, 2008 WL 4603565, at *15 (Ill. Oct. 17, 
2008); see also Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1334 (Conn. 1997) (describing 
controversy and rejecting the risk-utility test in the Restatement (Third)).  
 97 Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1159 (Md. 2002).  
 98 See, e.g., Mikolajczyk, 2008 WL 4603565, at *22.  
 99 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 Reporters’ n. cmt. d at 72 (1998) 
(discussing Potter, 694 A.2d 1319). 
 100 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective 
Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 867 (1998). 
 101 See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text. 
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ought to be substantively compatible with the liability rules in the 
Restatement (Third). Case law that adopts the risk-utility test in the 
Restatement (Third), for example, has often evolved from earlier 
decisions that defined consumer expectations in risk-utility terms.102 Like 
the risk-utility test, other important liability rules in the Restatement 
(Third) can be justified by the value of consumer choice.103 The two 
Restatements can be squared in this fundamental respect, and so the de-
emphasis of consumer expectations in the Restatement (Third) should not 
prevent courts from adopting its liability rules. The liability rules in the 
Restatement (Third) can be deemed a success, regardless of what one 
thinks about its rationale for products liability.  
  
 102 Compare Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834-35 (Iowa 1978) 
(“‘The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the 
ordinary consumer . . . .’ . . . Proof of unreasonableness involves a balancing process. On one side of 
the scale is the utility of the product and on the other is the risk of its use.”) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965)) (citation omitted), with Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 
652 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2002) (adopting the Restatement (Third)’s risk-utility test). 
 103 See supra Part II (explaining why the value of informed consumer choice justifies the 
liability rules in the Restatement (Third) governing construction, design and warning defects); supra 
Part III (explaining why the value of informed consumer choice justifies the rules in the Restatement 
(Third) concerning categorical liability and the affirmative defenses). 
